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ARTICLES

THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY:
A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR HOMEBUYERS
Bruce R. Toole* and Peter F. Habein**
I.

INTRODUCTION

We have long had the Uniform Commercial Code and strict
liability for buyers of all sorts of articles, from food to hand tools
to automobiles. It is strange that the current of social progress has
left barren and dry the island of real estate with the homebuyer
stranded on it. In Chandler v. Madsen,' however, the Montana Supreme Court washed away the island and swept the homebuyer
into the mainstream with this simple and straightforward
statement:
The doctrine of caveat emptor no longer serves the realities of
the marketplace. Therefore, we hold that the builder-vendor of a
new home impliedly warrants that the residence is constructed in
a workmanlike manner and is suitable for habitation.'
For most people the purchase of a home represents the largest
investment they will ever make. A new home represents the fulfillment of a dream-or so the buyer hopes. Previously, to protect his
dream in the event of faulty construction, the buyer had either to
prove fraud in the inducement to the sale or negligence in the construction of the home. Protecting one's house was thus significantly more difficult than protecting one's car or boat or gun.
No longer says the court; there will now be an implied warranty of habitability in Montana. Its American origins probably go
back no further than 1957 when the Ohio Court of Appeals decided
Vanderschrier v. Aaron.5 In Vanderschrier the court chose to
* J.D., University of Montana School of Law, 1949. Mr. Toole is a partner in the firm
of Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich in Billings, Montana. Mr. Toole represented Mr. and Mrs. Chandler and assisted at the birth of the warranty of habitability in
Montana.
** A.B., Dartmouth College, 1979; M.A., University of Virginia, 1980; J.D., University
of Montana School of Law, 1983.
1. __
Mont.
-,
642 P.2d 1028 (1982).

2. Id. at -, 642 P.2d at 1031.
3. 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957).
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adopt what it perceived to be the Law of England, finding "the
rule to be that, upon the sale of a house in the course of construction, there is an implied warranty that the house will be finished in
a workmanlike manner."4 A subsequent Colorado case, Carpenter
v. Donohoe,5 eliminated the imported technicality that the house
be bought while still under construction. By 1980 at least thirtyfive state courts had implied some form of habitability warranty to
protect purchasers of new homes. In Chandler v. Madsen Montana joined the growing majority.
This article projects the likely development of the warranty in
Montana and concludes with some thoughts on the process of judicial lawmaking which produced the implied warranty of
habitability.

II.
A.

THE WARRANTOR

The Builder-Vendor

In Chandler, the court held that the "builder-vendor" was liable under the implied warranty of habitability for defects in the
home he had constructed. A seller becomes a "builder-vendor" if
he also built the house, as in Chandler, or if he contracted with a
builder to construct the house for sale.' The term "builder-vendor"
is analogous to "merchant" in the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC): it denotes one who "by his occupation holds himself out as
having knowledge or skill" in the construction and sale of new
homes. 9 The analogy, however, is misleading in one particular: warranties under the UCC arise from the business of selling, not from
manufacture. But as most courts apply the warranty of habitability
to new homes, it is closely tied to the actual construction-hence,
the term "builder-vendor."
B.

The Lender-Vendor

A number of courts have distinguished sharply between the
"builder-vendor" and a "lender-vendor"-a lender who forecloses
4. Id. at 342, 140 N.E.2d at 821 (emphasis added).
5. 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
6. Shedd, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: New Implications, New Applications, 8 REAL EST. L.J. 291, 303 (1980).
7. See also Sloat v. Matheny, 625 P.2d 1031 (Colo. 1981).
8. Mazurek v. Nielsen, 42 Colo. App. 386, 599 P.2d 269 (1979); Klos v. Gockel, 87
Wash. 2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976); Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt. 467, 346 A.2d 210 (1975).
9. McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 398 A.2d 1283 (1979); Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wash.
2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976); Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt. 467, 346 A.2d 210 (1975). See UCC
§§ 2-104(1), 2-314(1) (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-2-104(1), 314(1) (1981)).
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on a defaulted builder, completes construction, and then sells the
home. 10 These courts hold that the lender is "not engaged in the
business of building and selling homes" and "cannot be said to
have warranted the construction because it did not do the construction."" Thus many courts at least implicitly hold that the
warranty arises chiefly from the business of building and not from
the sale.
This rigid distinction between the builder and seller makes little sense in the commercial setting and achieves an unsatisfactory
result. It often leaves the seller with the buyer's money and the
buyer with a defective house and an insolvent builder. If one purpose of the implied warranty is to place the risk of loss on the
party better able to bear it or prevent it,' 2 then the seller should be

treated no differently from the builder-vendor. As in the sale of
goods, the warranty should arise as much from the business of selling the new home as from its construction because it is often the
seller on whom the buyer in fact relies.13 That is, many buyers deal
exclusively with the seller and base their decision to purchase on
the seller's inevitable representations that the home is fit for
habitation. Whether a warranty arises from the sale of a home
should then depend upon whether the seller holds himself out as
having knowledge or skill peculiar to the business of selling homes.
III.

THE WARRANTY

In the case of a defect, it is not necessary for the owner of a
new home to prove that there was negligence or fraud on the part
of the builder. In Chandler the plaintiff alleged negligence and attempted to prove it. The trial court found that there may have
been negligence, but also found that the plaintiff failed to prove
such negligence was the proximate cause of the defects in the
house. The Montana Supreme Court refused to disturb that finding,14 sustaining the judgment for the plaintiff solely on the theory
of implied warranty of habitability. In effect, the only proof before
10. Walters v. First Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n., 131 Ariz. 321, 641 P.2d 235 (1982);
Smith v. Continental Bank, 130 Ariz. 320, 636 P.2d 98 (1981).
11. Smith v. Continental Bank, 130 Ariz. 320, 322, 646 P.2d 98, 100 (1981). See also
Comment, Washington's New Home Implied Warranty of Habitability - Expiration and
Model Statute, 54 WASH. L. Rev. 185, 205 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Wash. Comment].
12. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1120 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser]; Chandler,
Mont. at __,
642 P.2d at 1032.
13. Prosser, supra note 12, at 1123; Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt. 467, 346 A.2d 210 (1975);
Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968).
14. Chandler, Mont. at
-,
642 P.2d at 1032-33.
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the court was that the house was defective. There was no legally
effective proof showing why or how the defects developed.
A.

Workmanlike Construction

Although discussion in Chandler centers on the warranty of
habitability, the court arguably considered two implied warranties:
(1) "that the residence is constructed in a workmanlike manner"' 5
and (2) that it "is suitable for habitation."' 6 The commentators
have noted that the warranty of workmanlike construction is a
common law warranty implied in most service contracts. 7 The
warranty attaches to the reasonableness of the workman's conduct" and is closely related to the question of negligence in the
construction of the home." Although the court in Chandler did
not clearly distinguish the warranty of habitability from the warranty of workmanlike construction, the court plainly premised liability on habitability and not on a showing of negligence. As a matter of practice, the attorney could plead both warranties, but
questions of workmanlike construction and negligence will burden
the discovery process far more than the question of habitability.
B.

Habitability

Focusing on habitability, the court held that the central issue
is "whether the defect relates essentially to useful occupancy of the
house." 20 The court then reiterated, with slightly different emphasis, that the defect must be "essential to occupancy."'" This does
not mean that the house must become uninhabitable. The Chandlers, for instance, were living in their home at the commencement
of the suit and throughout the trial.2 2 Moreover, the court affirmed
the trial court's conclusion that the warranty of habitability was
breached because "settling of the house had caused it to develop
defects which greatly exceeded reasonable building tolerances" and
which "rendered the house insecure and . . . greatly depreciated
15.

Id. at

__

,642 P.2d at 1031.

16. Id.
17. Comment, Implied Warranties in the Sale of Real Estate in Colorado:Rational
Boundaries of the Doctrine, 53 U. CoLo. L. REV. 137, 145-47 (1981).
18. Lewis v. Anchorage Asphalt Paving Co., 535 P.2d 1188 (1975), appeal after remand, 579 P.2d 532 (Alaska 1978).
19. Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725 (Wyo. 1979), appeal after remand, 618 P.2d 144
(Wyo. 1979).
20. Chandler, Mont. at
-,
642 P.2d at 1032.
21. Id.
22. Cf. Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wash. 2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976) (failure to move out
held evidence that warranty was not breached).
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its value."2 3
The tests of habitability are imprecise and probably must remain so to accommodate a great variety of factual settings. Washington courts have adopted a relatively narrow test which demands
that the house be "unsafe for occupancy. '24 Limited to structural
defects, the Washington test has been criticized for its literal interpretation of "habitability" and its failure to implement the purpose of the warranty: to ensure that the buyer receives what he
bargained for-a home without major defects.2 5 In an early case,
the Idaho court adopted a broader view of the warranty:
The implied warranty of fitness does not impose upon the builder
an obligation to deliver a perfect house. No house is built without
defects, and defects susceptible of remedy ordinarily would not
warrant rescission. But major defects which render the house unfit for habitation, and which are not readily remediable, entitle
the buyer to rescission and restitution.2
More recently, the North Carolina court defined the warranty of
habitability in even more generous terms: "a builder-vendor impliedly warrants to the initial purchaser that a house and all its
fixtures will provide the service or protection for which it was in'27
tended under normal use and conditions.
In the end, the legal conclusion that the warranty has been
breached turns on the peculiar facts of each case. A sampling of
cases reveals breaches of the habitability warranty in houses with
the following defects: premature failure of a septic tank;2 8 faulty
electrical wiring;29 failure to waterproof the basement; ° leaking
roof;3" improper grading resulting in seepage; 2 cracked walls and
foundation;33 cracked driveway, unstable deck, malfunctioning of
air conditioning, stereo, and television;3 4 high iron content making
well water unusable; 5 sticking doors, poor patio drainage, and sag23. Order of the District Court, 13th Dist., Yellowstone Cnty., Mont. (January 15,
1981).
24. House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969).
25. Wash. Comment, supra note 11, at 205.
26. Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 68, 415 P.2d 698, 711 (1966).
27. Lyon v. Ward, 28 N.C. App. 446, 448, 221 S.E.2d 727, 729 (1976).
28. Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975).
29. Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979).
30. Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966).
31. Sorensen v. Pickens, 99 Idaho 564, 585 P.2d 1275 (1979).
32. Utz v. Moss, 31 Colo. App. 475, 503 P.2d 365 (1972).
33. Duncan v. Shuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 194 Colo. 441, 578 P.2d 637 (1978).
34. Sloat v. Matheny, 44 Colo. App. 1, 605 P.2d 71 (1980), rev'd on appeal, 625 P.2d
1031 (Colo. 1981).
35. Forbes v. Mercado, 283 Or. 291, 583 P.2d 552 (1979).
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ging ceilings;36 separation of chimney from house and leaky base38
ment;3 7 inadequate flow of water from well.
1.

Duration of the Warranty and Statutes of Limitation.

Generally, the duration of the warranty is measured by the
standard of reasonableness.3 Under this rule a builder's warranty
with respect to the foundation might very well be twenty years or
more, but less on non-structural components of the house. 40 Reasonable service life thus becomes a fact issue in each case, and the
service life would be measured from the initial sale."1
The duration of the warranty must be distinguished from any
statute of limitations problems which could arise in an action on
the warranty. Few cases have considered what statute of limita42
tions applies to a breach of the implied warranty of habitability.
The Montana court, however, might look to Oregon for some guidance. In Sponseller v. Meltebeke,3 the Oregon court applied a ten
year statute of limitations to an action on an implied warranty of
habitability.14 The plaintiff-owner had purchased the house in
1968, two years after its construction in 1966. By 1976 the house
was more than ten years old and had settled badly, resulting in
structural damage and damage to fixtures. By analogy to the UCC,
the owner argued that the implied warranty "explicitly extends to
future performance," and therefore "the cause of action accrues
when the breach is or should have been discovered. ' 45 The court
rejected this -analogy, holding that the house was an improvement
to real property and subject to the Oregon statute prescribing a ten
year limit on actions "to recover damages for. . . the construction
'46
• . . of any improvement to real property.
36. Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648
(1974).
37. Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1982).
38. Lyon v. Ward, 28 N.C. App. 446, 221 S.E.2d 727 (1976).
39. Padula v. J.J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29, 298 A.2d 529 (1973); Smith v. Old
Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D.
57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967).
40. Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975).
41. The Uniform Land Transaction Act establishes a uniform six-year limitation on
warranties, running from the initial sale. UNIF. LAND TRANS. AcT § 2-521. New Jersey has a
three-tiered limitation on the duration of warranties, depending on the nature of individual
defects. N.J. REV. STAT. § 36:3B-2, 3 (1937).
42. See, e.g., Ware v. Christenberry, 637 P.2d 452 (Kan. App. 1981); Sponseller v.
Meltebeke, 280 Or. 361, 570 P.2d 974 (1977).
43. 280 Or. 361, 570 P.2d 974 (1977).
44. OR. REV. STAT. § 12.135 (1976).
45. Sponseller, 280 Or. at 365, 570 P.2d at 976.
46. OR. REV. STAT. § 12.135 (1976).
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The Oregon statute is substantially similar to section 27-2-208
of the Montana Code Annotated: "no action to recover damages
• . .arising out of. . .construction . . .done in connection with
any improvement to real property shall be commenced more than
10 years after completion of such improvement. 4 7 Following the
reasoning in Sponseller v. Meltebeke, failure to discover a defect
would not toll the statute. Thus, the statute establishes a ten-year
limit to actions on the implied warranty of habitability, though the
duration of the warranty may be longer.
A final caveat, related to the statute of limitations, concerns
the requirement of notice. The UCC imposes a requirement that
the breaching party receive notice of the breach to allow for repair
and mitigation of damages.4 8 In Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Development Co.,4 9 the California Supreme Court applied this requirement
to a breach of the implied warranty of habitability. The court held
that four years was unreasonable delay in giving notice of a defect
and thus barred recovery under the warranty.50 The notice requirement seems commercially reasonable and may prove to be an additional limitation on recovery in Montana.
2.

Subsequent Purchasers.

The duration of the warranty is closely tied to issues of contract privity and protection of subsequent purchasers. The strict
requirement of contract privity does not limit the warranty in situations where the builder sells to a realtor, who in turn sells to the
first occupant of the house.5 1 The same is true when the original,
intended buyer resells to a third party without an intervening tenancy.52 A majority of courts, however, limit recovery under the
warranty to the first purchaser-occupant of the house. This limitation is rooted in the view, adopted by the Montana court in Chandler,51 that the warranty of habitability arises from a contract and
is subject to traditional contract principles. Privity is one such
principle which most courts are not willing to stretch beyond the
47. MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-208 (1981). The court complicated this analysis by holdMont. at
ing that "breach of an implied warranty is a breach of contract." Chandler, __
642 P.2d at 1034. It might be argued that section 27-2-208 is more specific and governs over the more general contract limitations. See also text accompanying notes 55-59.
48. UCC § 2-607(3) (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-607(3) (1981)).
49. 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974).
50. Id. at 380, 525 P.2d at 92, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
51. Utz v. Moss, 31 Colo. App. 475, 503 P.2d 365 (1972).
52. Gay v. Cornwall, 6 Wash. App. 595, 484 P.2d 1371 (1972).
-,
642 P.2d at 1034.
Mont. at
53. Chandler, -
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first purchaser.5 4
This limitation is mistaken at its roots. All commentators
agree that the action on a warranty evolved from tort into contract
and contains important elements from both forms of action. 5 At
least two prominent scholars have long argued persuasively that an
action on an implied warranty exists independently of the contract
and should not be limited by concepts of privity."6 Dean Prosser
arrived at this conclusion with inimitable clarity: "If warranty is a
matter of tort as well as contract, and if it can arise without any
intent to make it a matter of contract, then it should need no contract; and it may arise and exist between parties who have not
dealt with one another." 57 Such common sense is still a voice crying in the wilderness, but it underlies the growing number of decisions extending the implied warranty of habitability to subsequent
purchasers. By the end of 1982, five state courts had extended the
warranty to subsequent purchasers.5 8 They premised their decisions on Prosser's reasoning to the reality of the marketplace:
While the warranty of habitability has roots in the execution of
the contract for sale, we emphasize that it exists independently.
Privity of contract is not required. Like the initial purchaser, the
subsequent purchaser has little opportunity to inspect the construction methods used in building the home. Like the initial purchaser, the subsequent purchaser is usually not knowledgeable in
construction practices and must, to a substantial degree,
rely
59
upon the expertise of the person who built the home.
If the limitation of privity is lifted, the issue of who may recover
under the warranty will depend on the duration of the warranty
which in part depends on the nature of the defects.
In Chandler the plaintiffs attempted to raise a claim of strict
liability. They were foreclosed at trial and on appeal by both
courts' unwillingness to "discuss" strict liability once they had settled on the implied warranty contract 0 rationale. A strict liability
54. See, e.g., Mellander v. Kileen, 86 Ill.
App. 3d 213, 407 N.E.2d 1137 (1980).
55. S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 1505-06 (W. Jaeger 3d ed.
1970).
56. Jaeger, Product Liability: The Constructive Warranty, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 501
(1964); Prosser, supra note 12, at 1127.
57. Prosser, supra note 12, at 1127.
58. Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324 (Il1.1982); Elden v. Simmons, 631 P.2d
739 (Okla. 1981); Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980); Moxley v. Laramie
Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733 (Wyo. 1979); Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 264 Ind. 227, 342
N.E.2d 619 (1976).
59. Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324, 330 (111. 1982).
60.

Chandler, -

Mont. at

-,

642 P.2d at 103.
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action might have avoided the privity controversy 6' and provided
the courts with more flexibility in awarding damages. Theoretically, strict liability probably represents the true nature of the
warranty more faithfully than does the contract rationale adopted
by the court. 1"
3.

Damages.

Rescission, restitution, and money damages are available to
the homeowner in an action on an implied warranty.2 Rescission
alone is frequently inadequate because it fails to compensate for
improvements made prior to discovery of latent defects. In Chandler, for instance, the plaintiffs had invested substantial sums of
money in a swimming pool, fences, and other landscaping.
The court in Chandler held that damages were to be measured
under section 27-1-311 of the Montana Code Annotated: "the
amount which will compensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment which was proximately caused thereby or in the ordinary
course of things would be likely to result therefrom."'6 3 Under this
standard, the court held the builder liable for costs of repair plus
consequential damages for interim rental and moving expenses. In
addition, a few cases6" have held emotional distress to be a compensable item of damage:
The largest single investment the average American family will
make is the purchase of a home. . . Consequently, any reasonable builder could easily foresee that an individual would undergo
extreme mental anguish if their newly constructed house contained defects as severe as those shown to exist in this case."
This reasoning apparently overcomes the greatest barrier to
recovery for emotional distress in a contract action-foreseeability.
As a general rule, the foreseeability requirement defeats recovery
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(b).
647 P.2d 334
61.5 Cf. Thompson v. Nebraska Mobile Homes Corp., - Mont. -,
(1982) (manufacturer is strictly liable for defects in mobile home).
62. See, e.g., Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966) (Rescission,
restitution).
63. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-311 (1981). See also Mitchell v. Carlson, 132 Mont. 1, 313
P.2d 717 (1957) (benefit of the bargain measure of damages).
Because the award for repairs alone substantially exceeded the value of the house, the
court's treatment of damages in Chandler has already been criticized. See Burnham, Contract Damages in Montana Part I: Expectancy Damages, 44 MoNT. L. REv. 1, 27-28 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Burnham].
64. B & M Homes, Inc. v. Hogan, 376 So.2d 667 (Ala. 1979); Mid-State Homes, Inc. v.
Bice, 361 So.2d 275 (La. App. 1978). See also Annot., 7 A.L.R. 4th 1178 (1981).
65. B & M Homes, Inc. v. Hogan, 376 So.2d 667, 672 (Ala. 1979).
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for emotional distress,6" but some courts have carved narrow exceptions. A California court held that damages for emotional distress are permitted when the contract directly concerns the comfort and happiness of the party.6 7 The Montana court has not
considered this precise issue, but the contract rationale adopted in
Chandler makes recovery for emotional distress less likely than
under a tort or strict liability theory. In Chandler, plaintiffs
claimed damages for and presented evidence of emotional distress
under their strict liability action. As noted, however, the court did
not address this issue once it had decided the case on the warranty-contract theory.
4.

Disclaiming the Warranty.

The warranty of habitability may be disclaimed by the
builder-vendor. The Colorado Supreme Court has ruled, however,
that such disclaimers "must be accomplished by clear and unambiguous language" and "must also be strictly construed against the
builder-vendor." ' 8 The Missouri court in Crowder v.
Vandendeale9 went further:
[O]ne seeking the benefit of such a disclaimer must not only show
a conspicuous provision which fully discloses the consequences of
its inclusion but also that such was in fact the agreement reached.
The heavy burden thus placed upon the builder is completely justified, for by his assertion of the disclaimer he is seeking to show
that the buyer has relinquished protection afforded him by public
70
policy.
Some courts have held disclaimers of the implied warranty of habitability to the same standards promulgated by the UCC7 1 for
modification or exclusion of warranties in the sale of goods.7 2 Section 30-2-316 of the Montana Code Annotated codifies the general
"conspicuous" standard, the purpose of which is to "protect the
66.

See, e.g., Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 100 Idaho 840, 606 P.2d 944

(1980).
67. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1967). See also Burnham, supra note 61, at 11; Prosser, supra note 12, at 1128.
68. Sloat v. Matheny, 625 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Colo. 1981). See also Petersen v. Hubschman Constr. Co., 26 IM.2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979). Cf. Tibbita v. Openshaw, 18 Utah 2d
442, 425 P.2d 160 (1967) ("as is" clause in ordinary type held enforceable).
69. 564 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1978).
70. Id. at 881 n. 4. See also Colsant v. Goldschmidt, 97 I11. App. 3d 53, 421 N.E.2d
1073 (1981).
71. UCC § 2-316 (codified at MoNT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-316 (1981)).
72. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Mobley, 555 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. 1977); Casavant v.
Campopiano, 114 R.I. 24, 327 A.2d 831 (1974).
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buyer from unexpected and unbargained language. .

. ,,73 It is unclear, however, whether simply "conspicuous" language of disclaimer satisfies the purpose of the statute in Montana.7 4 A builder
seeking to disclaim warranties would be well advised to meet the
standard set out in Crowder and show that the disclaimer was in
fact part of the bargain.

IV.

THE QUESTION OF COVENANTS

Complaint has been made that the Chandler decision does vi75
olence to section 70-20-304 of the Montana Code Annotated
which limits what may be implied from a conveyance of real property.7 That section provides that only certain covenants are implied from the use of the word "grant" in a conveyance. No covenant of warranty of habitability is listed in the statute.
The question was not specifically addressed by the court in
Chandler. There is, however, a good answer to it. The Montana
statute was borrowed from the California Code, which in turn was
based upon the old Field Code. 7 In adopting the California Code,
Montana also adopted the California interpretations of it.7' Three
early California cases help to construe the statute as pertaining
only to covenants of title.7 ' The interpretation is made more forcibly in later cases. For instance, in Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Development Co.,80 the California court very specifically held that the
section does not say that warranties as to fitness and suitability of
structures upon land cannot arise unless expressed in the deed of
conveyance. A similar statute in Oregon has been construed as not
precluding implied covenants of habitability."
V.

JUDICIAL LAWMAKING

The Chandler rule, though new to Montana, is perhaps "old
MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-316 Comment 1 (1981).
74. Compare Schlenz v. John Deere Co., 511 F. Supp. 224 (D.C. Mont. 1981) with
Kopishke v. First Cont. Corp.,
- Mont.
-, 610 P.2d 668 (1980) and Transcont.
Refrig. Co. v. Figgins, 179 Mont. 12, 585 P.2d 1301 (1978) and Whitaker v. Farmhand, Inc.,
173 Mont. 345, 567 P.2d 916 (1977).
75. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-20-304 (1981).
76. See Cogley, New Liabilities for Homebuilders, MONT. LAWYER, May 1982 at 10
[hereinafter cited as Cogley].
77. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1113 (1979).
78. In re Murphy's Estate, 99 Mont. 114, 43 P.2d 233 (1935).
79. Waggle v. Worthy, 74 Cal. 266, 15 P. 831 (1887); Bryan v. Swain, 56 Cal. 616
(1880); Lawrence v. Montgomery, 37 Cal. 183 (1869).
80. Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 32 Cal. App. 3d 390, 108 Cal. Rptr. 174 (1973)
(citing Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968)).
81. Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or. 635, 525 P.2d 1019 (1974).
73.
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hat" to most lawyers. It has been around in our sister states for a
long time. What is really most fascinating about the Chandler case
is that the court chose to make new law. On appeal, considerable
issue was made in the Chandler case of the lawmaking character of
the decision. In making law, however, the Montana court was not
without precedent. But is precedent alone the limit to the power of
the court? When and under what circumstances should a court
take such drastic measures? These questions pose an ancient problem, a dicotomy between positive law and natural law which has
fascinated legal philosophers for centuries and to which there is
yet no pat solution but plenty of room for discussion.
In Chandler, the Montana Court took a leaf from
Brandenburger v. Toyota.82 As in Brandenburger,the court created new law, not merely an interpretation or a "filling in," but a
new rule imposing new duties and creating new rights. As was the
case with Brandenburger,there was plenty of precedent elsewhere
on which to base the Chandler decision. Nonetheless,
Brandenburger and Chandler help to give us a better view of the
ancient dicotomy, marshalling the need for certainty and clarity in
the law against the ill-defined but potent demand for justice.
Chandler poignantly demonstrates the dicotomy. Madsen was
a good builder and after the case was tried, no negligence of his
was found to have caused any loss to the plaintiff. 3 Any lawyer
adhering to established law would be hard pressed to advise Madsen in a similar situation that he should throw in the towel and
take back the house or spend tens of thousands of dollars repairing
it. After all, the law of caveat emptor in the sale of real property
has reigned supreme for centuries. If there is no stability in the law
governing the sale of real estate we lawyers might as well fold up
our tents and steal away. And yet consider that the plaintiffs mortgaged their future to buy this place, and they ended up with a
home where they could not lock the doors, where joints in the
plumbing were pulling apart, and there were so many creaks and
groans in the house that they hesitated even to have guests over
for supper because there was no conversation save that relating to
the house. Where is justice when the plaintiffs pay much and receive little?
Most lawyers are "positivists" at heart, preferring law clearly
laid down (posited), certain in its application, sanctions for its violation known and limited. Without this, how can a lawyer advise a
82. 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973) (strict products liability and doctrine of "second collission").
83. Chandler, Mont. at
-,
642 P.2d at 1032-33.
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client, prepare a contract, or try a lawsuit? Certainly the positivist
ideals are deep in our hearts. It is practically a constitutional mandate: "No ex post facto law nor any law impairing the obligation of
contracts, or making any irrevocable grant of special privileges,
franchises, or immunities, shall be passed by the legislature." 4
"No law contained in any of the statutes of Montana is retroactive
unless expressly so declared. '85 The Montana Supreme Court has
repeatedly stated that "it is a rule recognized by the authorities
everywhere that retrospective laws are looked upon with disfavor."8 6 The Montana court has been loath to take upon itself a
change of law, particularly in a retroactive manner.8 7
Chandler has been criticized for being new law, applied retroactively.8 8 Chandler is a new rule. It is a new law. It did operate
retroactively. Other cases of its ilk have long been questioned. But
some lawyers and scholars are delighted when justice, finally overcomes arbitrary rules and cruel logic:
All those whose mistress is the law ought to congratulate themselves for the good fortune of living in such exciting times. If stare
decisis were the rule of the day, the mutation reflected in implied
warranty as a remedy for structural deficiencies in unfinished
houses would have been the end of the matter. As it was, facts
and environment conspired, at least in America, to illustrate that
rules and logic are not the whole of the law story. Facts involving
roofs sustained by several nails, together with an environment in
which building has become an assembly-line affair, have conspired to undermine everyman's respect for caveat emptor as the
distillation of justice. .

.

. [J]ustice requires man-made rules that

change in the light of new facts and an evolving environment, and
at the same time serve as provisional polestars illuminating the
here and now so that the day's business can be done. The shock
of recognizing that there may be no pragmatically sanctioned
rules, even in the short run, has hit the housing-merchant scene
with full force. The job now is to restructure the market in light
of the bits and pieces of conventional wisdom found in the decisions which shattered the repose of caveat emptor.8"
Particularly when judges are about to declare new law, they
MONT. CONST. ART. II, § 31.
85. MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-2-109 (1981).
86. Dunham v. Southside National Bank, 169 Mont. 466, 548 P.2d 1383 (1976); Sullivan v. City of Butte, 65 Mont. 495, 211 P. 301 (1922).
87. Kussler v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,
- Mont.
-, 606 P.2d 520 (1980);
Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Osier,
- Mont.
-, 605 P.2d 1076 (1979).
88. Cogley, supra note 74, at 10.
89. Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52
CORNELL L.Q. 835, 868 (1967).
84.
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speak in profound and ringing terms about the need for justice:
"The law should be based upon current concepts of what is right
and just and the judiciary should be alert to the never-ending need
for keeping its common law principles abreast of the times."9 0
With characteristic eloquence, Justice Cardozo declared, "If judges
have willfully misinterpreted the mores of their day, or if the mores of their day are no longer those of ours, they ought not to tie,
in helpless submission, the hands of their successors."9
The judges, however, rarely address the question of how they
acquired the authority to declare society's morals, mores, and
rights and wrongs. They should address that question, for what
seems moral and proper to one judge may seem quite the contrary
to another.
Notwithstanding the philosophical problem with the declaration of what is "justice," we lawyers accept the fact that courts
make law. Certainly the Montana court need not be embarrassed
for arrogating to itself the lawmaking power. It is in good company. In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company92 and in Greenman v. Yuba Power & Light," prestigious courts made new rules
and found a new morality in the law of torts. The Montana court
in Brandenburger and Chandler has done nothing radical compared to them.
There is ample philosophical support for judicial lawmaking.
Thomas Aquinas said, "Law is nothing else than an ordinance of
reason for the common good, promulgated by him who has the care
of the community. The natural law is promulgated by the very fact
that God instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him
naturally. ' 94 William Blackstone added that the natural law "is
binding over all the globe in all countries, and at all times: no
human laws are of any validity if contrary to this; and such of
them as are valid derive all their force and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original."9' 5 Perhaps this is just a
long way of trying to explain why many of us intuitively sense that
the Montana court reached the correct result in Chandler.
From the beginning of civilization, courts have tried to grace
the dicotomy between the need for certainty, predictability and
90. Padula v. J.J. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29, 31, 298 A.2d 529, 531 (1973).
91. B. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, 136-37 (1924) (quoted in Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Wyo. 1975)).
92. 217 N.J. 282, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
93. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
94. SUMA THEOLOGICA OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (Benziger ed. 1947) (quoted in E.
BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE 25 (1978)).

95.

1 W.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

31 (Lewis ed. 1900).
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promulgation of law (positive law) and the need for morality, justice, and reason (natural law). "Hard cases" do not necessarily
make bad law, but they do make law and they are the fiery point
of impact between these ancient but alive and vital contesting
philosophies.
Chandler is a "hard case," as was MacPherson, Greenman,
and at our local level, even Brandenburger.There are many others.
In each a new right and a new duty were found. There will be hard
cases again. Their resolution is a timeless process. It is a process
which the criticisms of Chandler failed to take into account. Its
result is judge-made law.
The decisions of our courts in cases like MacPherson, Greenman, and Brandenbergerhave renewed interest by legal scholars in
the process of judge-made law. Indeed, not since the 1930's has the
process been studied, rationalized, and defined with such care by
jurisprudents." But one is hard pressed to find in all the writings a
satisfactory statement of the limit on judges to make law, to fashion remedies, and to thereby inspire the body of the written law
with the soul of justice. There is, of course, a political limit. So
long, however, as decisions accord with prevailing concepts of fairness, reason, and common good, the political limit will not be approached. The beckoning of the natural law, ancient though its call
may be, is still a potent force, and Chandler is its natural
offspring.

96. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1977); H. KELSON,
PURE THEORY LAW (N. Knight trans. 1967); H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961);
Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble
Dream, 11 GA. L. REv. 969 (1977).
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